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830 ESTATlil OJ' NEWTON [35C.2d 
[L. A. No. 20827. In Bank. Sept. 7, 1950.] 
Estate of ARTHUR B. NEWTON, Deceased. THOMAS H. 
KUCHEL, as State Controller, etc., Appellant, v. BEV-
ERLY M. NEWTON, Respondent. 
[1) Wills-Powers of Appointment.-A power of appointment was 
exercised in this state in which the donee died a resident, 
rather than in the state in which he made the will and ap-
pointment therein, since a will takes effect at death. 
[SI) Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Power of Appointment.-
The exercise of a power of appointment over out-of-state 
personal property in the will of the donee who dit'-d a resi-
dent of this state was taxable under section 2 (6) of the 
Inheritance Tax Act of 1935 as amended in 1941 (Stats. 1941, 
p. 1222; now embodied in Rev. &; Tax. Code, §§ 13692, 13693), 
where the donor died before th .. effective date of the act, and 
the power was exercised thereafter. (Overruling conflicting 
declarations in Estate of Bowditch (1922), 189 Cal. 377, 208 
P.282.) 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County sustaining objections to report of inheritance 
tax appraiser. Harold B. Jeffery, Judge. Reversed. 
James W. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, Morton 
L. Barker, Senior Inheritance Tax Attorney, and Vincent J. 
McMahon, Assistant Inheritance Tax Attorney, for Appellant. 
Leon W. Delbridge, Brady & Nossaman and Walter L. 
Nossaman for Respondent. 
McCutchen, Thomas'IMatthew, Griffiths & Greene as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
SHENK, J .-The State Controller has appealed from an 
order sustaining objections to the report of the inheritance tax 
appraiser and fixing inheritance tax in the sum of $14.08, 
which was less by $31,105.19 than the amount fixed in the 
report. 
The facts are not in dispute. A testamentary trust was 
[2] Inheritance tax on property under power of appointment, 
Dotes, 141 A.L.R. 954; 150 A.L.R. 73. See, also 24 Cal.Jur. 445; 
28 Am.Jur. 68, 78. 
licK. Dii. References: [1] Wills, § 324; [2] Taxation, 1426. 
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created in the State of New York by Charles E. Newton. the 
decedent's father, who died a resident of that state on October 
19, 1921. The trust provided for an income to the decedent 
during his life. Further provisions gave him the power by 
will to appoint his wife to take on his death a specified propor-
tion of the trust assets. The decedent executed a will in New 
York on May 2d, 1930, whereby he appointed his wife as the 
beneficiary. Later he and his wife removed to California where 
as a resident he died on March 11, 1943, leaving his widow, the 
respondent herein. His will was admitted to probate. 
The assets of the trust subject to the appointment consist 
entirely of intangibles valued at $412,510.36 held in trust by 
New York trustees. There are no shares of California corpora-
tions. The widow objected to the Controller's report on the 
ground that under the decision in Estate of Bowditch, 189 
Cal. 377 [208 P. 282, 23 A.L.R. 735], the state was without 
jurisdiction to impose the portion of the tax measured by the 
appraised value of the intangibles held in New York. 
[1] There is no merit in the contention that the exercise 
of the power of appointment occurred at the time the decedent 
made his will in New York. Since a will takes effect as of the 
time of the death of the testator there can be no question that 
the death of the decedent determined the time of the exercise 
of the power. (Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 329 [41 P. 1089, 
50' Am.St.Rep. 43].) 
[2] Prior to 1922 the history regarding the taxation in 
this state of transfers of property through the gift or exercise 
of powers of appointment was substantially the following: 
The Inheritance Tax Act of 1905 (Stats. 1905, p. 341, § 1), 
made taxable the exercise of powers of appointment as a 
transfer of property by will from the donee of the power. 
(Provisions regarding nonc:sercise of the power· will not be 
. ,,_._.. ;no:ted.LT.he Inheritance Tax Act of 1913 (Stats. 1913, p. 
1066) repealed that provision with a saving clause, and in 
section 3 provided that the gift of a power of appointment 
'Was a taxable transfer of property from the donor to the 
donee upon the death of the donor. In 1917 (Stats. 1917, p. 
880) the 1913 enactment was repealed with a saving clause 
and the Legislature reverted to the 1905 provision, again 
making taxable the transfer by the exercise of the power 
(§ 2(6», and it remained so until 1935. In the 1917 act 
(§ 1(2» the words "estate" and "property" included aU 
personal property of resident decedents within or without 
,~ state. 
) 
... __ ... _----_ ..... " .... _ .....• _._-
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In August 1922 this court decided Estate 01 Bowditch, 
BUpra (189 CaL 377). The resident decedent, Charlotte Bow-
ditch, was the donee of a power to appoint and did appoint by 
will the beneficiary of a trust created under the will of her 
father, a Massachusetts domiciliary. The trust assets amount-
ing in value to. some $299,000 consisted entirely of personal 
property, the nature of which was not disclosed in the opinion, 
located in Massachusetts. The facts were in essence parallel 
to those of the present ease and the appeal brought to this 
court the question whether the state had jurisdiction to include 
the transfer by the decedent's exercise of the power of appoint-
ment as a taxable transfer. The court recognized that a 
succession to property effected independently of the. authority 
of a particular state was not taxable by that state and was 
not within the purview of its inheritance tax acts. In applying 
the test it was observed that the state had plenary' power over 
the administration and disposition of estates of persons domi-
ciled here including personal property wherever situated. and 
that jurisdiction to exercise the taxing power attached when 
there was actual or constructive situs of the property within 
the state. The court concluded, however, that under the facts 
the state could not tax the transfer effected through the exer-
cise of the power by the decedent. The court relied on United 
States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257 [41 8. Ct. 256, 65 L.Ed. 617], 
Walker v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 221 Mass. 600 [109 
N.E. 647], and Shattuck v. B1trrage, 229 Mass. 448 [118 N.E. 
889], in making the following statement ~ "But personal 
property which is the subjeet of a power of appointment does 
not acquire a iConstructive situs in the state of the domicile of 
the donee of the said power under this theory lie. that per-
sonal estate wherever situated is deemed to have the situs of 
the domicile of the owner], for such property is no part of 
the estate of the donee. 'When a donor gives to another power 
of appointment over property. the donee of the power does 
not. thereby become the owner of the property. The donee h."lS 
no title wh3tever to the property. The power is simply" 
delegation to the donee of authority to nct for the donor in 
the disposition of the latter's property' . . . Therefore, for 
the purpose of testamentary succession and distribution, the 
property here involved has acquired no situs in t.his state, 
either aetual or constructive, and the laws of f\la.'!Sachusctts 
alone control the transfer thereof under the will of Charlott.e 
Bowditeh. " Thus the theory was that since the intere::;t of 
the transferee was derived from the will of the .M.assaehu&eta 
) 
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donor, there was no resort to the sovereignty of this state for 
the transfer of the property interest through the decedent'. 
exercise of the power of appointment. (See Estate of Dilling-
ham, 196 Cal. 525, 533-534 [238 P. 367].) 
In 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 693, § 1 (2» the following italicized 
words were added in the definition of "estate" and "prop-
erty" to include "all personal property within or without 
the state or subject to the jurisdiction thereof." 
Between that year and the next statutory change the United 
States Supreme Court decided W aehovia Bank d'; Trust Co. 
v. Doughton (1926),272 U.S. 567 [47 S.Ct. 202, 71 L.Ed. 413]. 
The facts were somewhat similar to those in the Bowditch 
case. The donor died in Massachusetts leaving a will probated 
there. A trust created thereby, located and administered in 
Massachusetts, gave to the donor's daughter the power to 
appoint the beneficiary of trust assets consisting of intangibles 
valued at nearly $400,000. The donee appointed beneficiaries 
by will and died a resident of North Carolina. The question 
of the jurisdiction of North Carolina to tax the exercise of 
the power under a statute designating the exercise thereof as 
a transfer taxable in the same manner as though the property 
belonged absolutely to the donee was presented to the Supreme 
Court. The court noted the principles of the cases above 
cited, among others, as those commonly accepted as controlling 
the question of the constructive situs of the intangibles in 
the taxing state and concluded that no right exercised by the 
donee was conferred by North Carolina; therefore that North 
Carolina did not have jurisdiction to impose the tax. Mr. 
Justice Holmes stated his disRenting view that the result was 
irreconcilable with Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 [36 
8.0t. 473,£0 L:Ed.-8301,where thegenernJ power was con-
sidered to have thc skme effect as ownership. 
In 1935 (Stats. 1935, p. 1266) the Legislature amended 
section 2 (6) to make the gift of the power a taxable transfer 
as in the 1913 statute. As amended the section read: "When-
ever any person or corporation shall be given a power of 
appointment by virtue of any disposition of property made 
before or after the passage of this act, such gift of power of 
appointment shall, under the provisions of this act, be deemed 
a taxable transfer made from the donor of said power to the 
donee thereof at the date of the donor's death; provided that 
where the donor of a power of appointment dies prior to the 
• C.2d-41 
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taking effect of this amendment and the power is exercised 
thereafter the exercise of said power of appointment shall be 
deemed a transfer taxable as provided in subdivision 6 of 
section 2 of the Inheritance Tax Act of 1921 as amended in 
1929." At the same time the definition of "estate" and 
"property" (§ 1(2» was amended to include "all intangible 
personal property of resident decedents wii.hin or without the 
State or subject to the jurisdiction thereof." 
The foregoing provisions of section 2 (6), with the addition 
of the words" general or limited" preceding the words" power 
of appointment," were in effect retained by the amendment 
of 1941 (Stats. 1941, p. 1222, now embodied in Rev. & Tax. 
Code, §§ 13692 and 13693). The 1935 act as amended in 1941 
was the statute in force at the time of the decedent's death 
in 1943. The result was to impose the tax on a transfer by 
the gift of the power of appointment made by a resident donor, 
except that the imposition of the tax on a transfer through 
the exercise of the power by a resident donee was saved where 
the donor had died prior to the effective date of the 1935 
amendment. The death of the donor, decedent's father, prior 
to the effective date of the 1935 statute calls for the applica-
tion of the saving clause to the decedent's exercise of the 
power. There is no question of the correctness of the inheri-
tance tax appraiser's computation of the tax if the statute 
applies to impose it. 
In 1938 the Supreme Court decided Curry v. McCanless, 
307 U.S. 357 [59 8.Ct. 900, 83 L.Ed. 1339, 123 A.L.R. 162], 
and Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 [59 S.Ct. 913, 83 L.Ed. 
1356]. In the McCanless case the question was whether 
Tennessee as well as Alabama might constitutionally impose 
death taxes uponl the transfer of an interest in intangibles 
held in trust in Alabama but passing by testamentary appoint-
ment under a donated power exercised by a decedent domiciled 
in Tennessee. The decedent was both the donor and the donee 
of the power. By statute Tennessee iInposed a tax on transfers 
of resident decedents' intangible property wherever located in-
cluding transfers under powers of appointment. The Supreme 
Court noted the nature of intangibles, the practical difficulties 
in applying to them a physical situs, and the sovereign power 
which extends over intangibles of a domiciled decedent al-
though they have no physical location within the state exercis-
ing the power. It was declared that a jurisdiction which does 
not depend on physical presence within the state is not lost 
by declaring that it is absent. It was held that the power to 
Sepl1950] ESTATE OF NEWTON 
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tax the intangibles was not lost because the court might choose 
to say that they were located elsewhere; that the decedent's 
power to dispose of intangibles was a potential source of 
wealth and therefore property in his hands; and that there 
was no substantial difference between that and any other case 
in which at the moment of death the evidences of intangibles 
passing under the will of a decedent domiciled in one state 
were physically present in another. The conclusion followed 
that the transfer was taxable under the Tennessee statute. 
The Elliott case determined that New York might constitu-
tionally tax a domiciliary's relinquishment at death of a 
power to revoke a trust of intangibles held by a Colorado 
trustee. Following the McCanless decision it was held that the 
right to revoke the trust had the attributes of property and 
was a potential source of wealth; that the legal interest in the 
intangibles held in trust in Colorado was not so dissociated 
from the person of the decedent as to be beyond the taxing 
power of the state of domicile any more than the decedent's 
other rights in intangibles. The court said that, as in the case 
of any other intangibles, control over the person and estate of 
the decedent at the place of domicile and the duty of decedent 
to contribute to the support of government there, afforded 
adequate constitutional bases for the imposition of a tax meas-
ured by the value of the intangibles transmitted or relin-
quished at death. The fact that the power was donated by 
another was held to be without significance. Reliance was in 
part on Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 [36 S.Ct. 473, 60 
L.Ed. 830], invoked as support for the dissenting view in the 
Wachovia case. (See also Orr v. Gilman (1901), 183 U.S. 
278 [22 S.Ct. 213, 46 L.Ed. 196J ; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 
U.S. 189 [23 S.Ct. 277,47 L.Ed 439] ; Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 
U.S. 466 [27 S.Ct. 550, 51 L.Ed. 882]. Cf. Brooke v. City of 
Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 [48 A.Ct. 422, 72 L.Ed. 767] ; Safe De-
posit If T. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 [50 S.Ct. 59, 74 L.Ed. 
180].) 
The foregoing declarations disclosed the fundamental error 
in arriving at a contrary conclusion in the Wachovia and 
Bowditch cases by the failure to ascribe the recognized pro-
prietary attributef': to similar acts. Consequently in Graves v. 
Schmidlapp (1942).315 U.S. 657 [62 S.Ct. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097, 
141 A.L.R. 948] the Snprl'me Court overruled the Wachovia 
case in applying the Bullen. McCanless and Elliott flecisions 
to sustain the constitutional power of New York to tax the 
) 
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transfer effected by a resident decedent's exercise of a power 
of appointment created by the will of a nonresident donor in 
respect to intangibles held in trust in Massachusetts. In re-
versing the New York Court of Appeals' affirmance of the 
Surrogate's decree which reduced the assessed estate tax on 
the authority of the Wachovia case, the Supreme Court said: 
"The conclusion there reached and the reasons advanced in 
its support cannot be reconciled with the decision and the 
reasoning of the Bullen, the McCanless and the Elliott cases. 
It is plain that if appropriate emphasis be placed on the 
orderly administration of justice rather than blind adherence 
to conflicting precedents, the W achovia ca~e must be over-
ruled. There is no reason why the state should continue to be 
deprived of revenue from a subject which from the beginning 
has been within the reach of its taxing power; a subject over 
which we cannot say the state's control has been curtailed by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. No 
interest which could be served by so rigid an adherence to 
stare decisis is superior to the demands of a system of justice I 
based on a considered and a consistent application of the 
Constitution. " 
Points of similarity or difference in the various cases are 
immaterial because they also are of no significance here. There 
can now be no question of the power of California to impose 
the tax in question; and conflicting declarations which led to 
a contrary result in the Bowditch case are overruled. The 
statute clearly provides that the exercise of the power of 
appointment is deemed .. a transfer taxable under the provi-
sions of this act, in the same manner as though the property 
to which such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the 
donee of such power, and had been bequeathed or derived by 
such donee by I will." (Inheritance Tax Act of 1921, as 
amended in 1929, § 2(6), Stats. 1929, p. 1834.) The statutory 
provision as incorporated in the 1935 act is applicable here 
and supports the imposition of the tax reported by the in· 
heritance tax appraiser. 
The order is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-J concur, but deem it advisable to spell ont 
with particularity the reasons for my concurrence. 
The Inheritance Tax Acts of this state plainly provide for 
.) 
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the imposition of the tax in the present case. Section 2 of 
the Inheritance Tax Act of 1935 as amended in 1941, by whieh 
this appeal is governed, provides: 
"A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon, the transfer 
of any property, real or personal, or of any interest therein 
or income therefrom, in trust or otherwise . . . said taxes 
to be upon the market value of such property at the date of 
death of the decedent and at the rates hereinafter pre-
scribed ... 
"(6) Powers of appointment. Whenever any person or cor-
poration shall be given a general or limited power of appoint-
ment by virtue of any disposition of property made before 
or after 5 p.m. of June 25, 1935, such gift of power of ap-
pointment shall, under the provisions of this act ... be 
deemed a taxable transfer made from the donor of said power 
to the donee thereof at the date of the donor's death, except 
that: 
"(a) Where the donor of a power of appointment died 
prior to 5 p.m. of June 25, 1935, and the power is exercised 
thereafter, the exercise of said power of appointment shall 
be deemed a transfer taxable as provided in Subdivision (6) 
of Section 2 of the Inheritance Tax Act of 1921, as amended 
in 1929." (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8495, § 2, pp. 3207-
3208.) 
Subdivision (6) of section 2 of the Inheritance Tax Act 
of 1921 as amended in 1929 provides: 
"Whenever any person, trustee or corporation shall ex-
ercise a power of appointment derived from any disposition 
of property made either before or after the passage of this 
____ . __ ... ___ ac~,8Uchappoint~e..nt, when made, shall be deemed a transfer 
. taxable under the pf(ovisions of this act, ,n the same manner 
as though the property to which such appointment relates 
belonged absolutely to the donee of such power, and had been 
bequeathed or derived by such donee by will." (Stats. 1929, 
ch. 844, pp. 1836-1837. Italics added.) 
Subdivision (~) of section 1 of the 1935 act provides that 
"'property' as used in this act ... shall include all in-
tangible personal property of resident decedents within or 
without the State or subject to the jurisdiction thereof." (3 
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8495, § 1 (2), p. 3206.) 
Decedent's father, the donor of the power, died in 1921. 
Decedent died domiciled in California on March 11, 1943, 
leaving a will executed in New York in 1930 appointing his 
) 
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wife, respondent bcrein, beneficiary under his power of ap-
pointment of the trust assetll. His will was probated in Cali-
fornia. Since the donor of the power died before June 25, 
1935, and the power was exercised after that date, the 192] 
and 1935 acts clearly impose a tax on the transfer of the 
trust assets from decedent to his wife by virtue of decedent'8 
exercise of the power of appointment since the appointment is 
"deemed a transfer taxable under the provisions of this act, 
in the same manner as though the property to which such 
appointment relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such 
power. and had been bequeathed or derived by such donee by 
will. " 
Respondent contends, however, that, notwithstanding the 
express statutory provisions for the taxation of the transfer, 
the transfer is not taxable under the decision of this court 
in Estate of Bowditch, 189 Cal. 377 [208 P. 282. 23 A.L.R. 735]. 
In her view, the Bowditch case, unlike Wachovia Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567, 575 [47 S.Ct. 202, 71 
L.Ed. 413], did not decide that there is a constitutional impedi. 
ment to the imposition of the tax. She views Estate of Bow-
ditch as a decision that the California Inheritance Tax Acts 
do not apply to transfers of property by one who, under 
California property law, is not the owner of the property 
transferred. Sh~ asserts that since the Bowditch case decided 
only that the statute did not impose such a tax, it is un-
a1Iected by the decision of the United States Supreme Court 
in Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 [62 8. Ct. 870, 86 L.Ed. 
1097, 141 A.L.R. 948], that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not prohibit its imposition. 
Respondent's contention finds no support in the language of 
the statute or in the decisionofthis-eourt in-Estate of Bow-
ditch. The iimposition of an inheritance or estate tax does 
not depend on the decedent's ownership of the property under 
common law principles. The tax is not imposed on the prop· 
erty. but on the decedent's transfer of that property. 
When, as in the present case, the statute expressly makes the 
transfer of property taxable "in the same manner as though 
the property ... belonged absolutely" to the decedent, it is 
irrelevant that under common law concepts of property own-
ership the property did not belong absolutely to the decedent. 
The only question then is whether the imposition of such a 
tax is within the constitutional power of the state. 
Since 1901 it has been recognized that the stat(' may properly 
tax the transfer of property by the donee of the power to 
) 
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his appointee under its plenary power to control succession 
to the estates of its domiciliaries. "Whatever may be the. 
technical source of title of a grantee under a power of ap-
pointment it cannot be denied that, in reality and substance, 
it is the execution of the power that gives the grantee the 
property passing under it ... When David Dows, Senior, 
devised this property to the appointee under the will of his 
son he necessarily subjected it to the charge that the State 
might impose on the privilege accorded to the son of making 
a will. That charge is the same in character as if it had been 
laid on the inheritance of the estate of the son himself, that 
is, for the privilege of succeeding to property under a will." 
(Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278,282-283 [22 S.Ct. 213, 46 L.Ed. 
196] ; Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466, 474-475, 477 [27 S.Ct. 
550,51 L.Ed. 882].) 
"Decedent's ... power to dispose of the intangihles at 
death was property in his hands in New York, where he was 
domiciled. Graves v. Elliott, supra. He there made effective 
use of the power to bestow his bounty on the widow. Its exer-
cise by will to make a gift was as much an enjoyment of a 
property right as would have heen a like bequest to his 
widow from his own securities. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 
U.S. 112, 117 [61 S.Ct. 144, 85 L.Ed. 75, 131 A.L.R. 655]. 
. . . Taxation of such enjoyment of the power to dispose of 
property is as much within the constitutional power of the 
state of his domicile as is the taxation of the transfer at 
death of intangibles which he owns. 
C C Since it is the exercise of the power to dispose of the 
intangibles which is the taxable event, the mere fact that the 
power was acquired as a donation from another is without 
significance. We can perceive no ground for saying that its 
exercise by the p.onee is for that reason any the less the enjoy-
ment of a property right, or any the less subject to taxation 
at his domicile. The source of the power by gift no more 
takes its exercise by the donee out of. the taxing power than 
the like disposition of a chose in action or a share of stock, 
ownership of which is acquired by gift." (Graves v. Schmid-
lapp, 315 U.S. 657, 662-663 [62 S.Ct. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097, 141 
A.L.R. 948].) 
Grave! v. Schmidlapp did not alter any concepts of property 
ownership. The taxability of transfers of property by a 
donee's exercise of a power of appointment was established 
by the Orr and Cbanler cases under statutes identical with 
840 ESTATE OF NEWTON [85C.2d 
section 2 (6) of the 1921 act under which Estate of Bowditch 
was decided. (See also, Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 
[36 S.Ct. 473, 60 L.Ed. 830].) Nor did United States v. 
Field, 255 U.S. 257 (41 8.Ct. 256, 65 L.Ed. 617], announce a 
different rule. In that case, the court was not concerned 
with a statute expressly taxing the transfer of property by the 
donee's exercise of a power of appointment such as those 
before it in the Orr and Chanler cases or that before the 
California Supreme Court in Estate of Bowditch. The Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue sought to include in the de-
cedent's gross estate the value of property subject to the 
decedent's power of appointment derived from her husband'8 
will, on the theory that the donee of a power of appointment 
was the owner of property subject thereto within the meaning 
of section 202 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1916.- He relied, 
not on a statutory provision taxing the transfer of property 
by the exercise of a power of appointment, but on the gen-
eral provision including in a decedent's gross estate all prop-
erty owned by the decedent at the time of his death. The court 
held that there was no question "as to the power of Congress 
to impose a tax upon the passing of property under testa-
mentary execution of a power of appointment," regarding 
that question as settled by Ghanler v. Kelsey. It held that 
the only question was whether Congress had done so. The 
exercise of the power, in the absence of specific statutory 
provision therefor, did not of itself require the inclusion of 
the appointed property in the gross estate of the donee, and 
the court held that since Congress had not expressly authorized 
the inclusion of the appointed property in the decedent's 
gross estate the tax eouId not be sustained. (United States v. 
Field, 255 U.S. 257, 263 (41 8.Ct. 256,65 L.Ed. 617J.) Since 
the decision in the Field case, and without any change in 
concepts of property ownership, Congress bas enacted legisla-
tion including in the donee's gross estate property subject to 
his power of appointment as if he were the absolute owner 
thereof. (Internal Revenue Code § 811 (f].) There has been 
no change in the concept of property ownership enunciated 
by the Field case; that decision is still applicable to powers 
of appointment exercised before the enactment of section 
811 (f). Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Go., 316 U.S. 
56, 63 [62 8.Ct. 925, 86 L.Ed. 1266, 139 A.L.R. 1518].) 
-Now section 811 (a) of tlle Internal Revenue Code, requiring the in· 
clusion in the decedent's gross estate of all property "to the extent of 
the iJaterest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." 
) 
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Congress did, however, under the same concepts of property 
ownership underlying the Field decision, enact a statute by 
which property transferred by the exercise or nonexercise of a 
power of appointment is deemed transferred by the donee of 
the power and included in his gross estate. (HeZvering v. 
Safe Deposit & Trust 00., 316 U.S. 56, 65 [62 8.Ct. 925, 86 
L.Ed. 1266, 139 A.L.R. 1513].) 
The basis of the decision in the Bowditch case is not that 
the transfer of property by appointment may not be taxed 
as a transfer by will from the donee, but that California did 
not have the constitutional power to tax the transfer if the 
evidences of ownership of the intangible personal property 
transferred were located outside the state. The court ex-
pressly held that the plenary power of the state to tax succes-
sion to property could not be asserted in that case for the 
reason that "both the physical and constructive situs of the 
[appointed] property" was outside the state. Since the legal 
title was held by nonresident trustees and the evidences of 
ownership of the intangibles transferred in that case were 
located outside the state, the court held that California did 
not have jurisdiction to tax the transfer of that property by 
the will of a resident decedent. The tax could be sustained 
"only in the event that the personal property which is the 
subject of the said power is within the jurisdiction of the 
state." (Estate of Bowditch, 189 Cal. 377, 380 [208 P. 282, 
23 A.L.R. 735].) The court's determination of California's 
"jurisdiction to impose an inheritance tax" was cited with 
approval in the 1926 decision of the United States Supreme 
Court holding that the imposition of a similar tax under an 
identical statute was Ibeyond the constitutional power of the 
State of North Carolina. (Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Doughton, 272 U.S. 567, 575 [47 8.Ct. 202, 71 L.Ed. 413].) 
The error of the decisions in the Bowditch and Wachovia 
Bank & Trust cases arose out of the reasoning that intangible 
personal property must have a situs or physical location. 
Althougb the situs of realty or tangible personal property 
controls the jurisdiction of a state to tax the transfer thereof 
(Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 489 [45 8.Ct. 603, 69 
L.Ed. 1058]; Treichler v. State of Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 
[70 8.Ct. 1, 3-4, 94 L.Ed. --]), "very different considera-
tions, both theoretical and practical, apply to the taxation of 
intangibles, that is, rights which are not related to physical 
things. Such rights are but relationships between persons, 
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natural or corporate, which the law recognizes by attaching 
to them certain sanctions enforceable in courts. The power 
of government over them and the protection which it gives 
them cannot be exerted through control of a physical thing. 
They can be made effective only through control over and 
protection afforded to those persons whose relationships are the 
origin of the rights. See Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 
174 U.S. 710, 716 [19 S.Ct. 797,43 L.Ed.1144] ; Harris v. Balk, 
198 U.S. 215, 222 [25 8.Ot. 625, 49 L.Ed. 1023]. Qbviously, 
88 sources of actual and potential wealth-which is an ap-
propriate measure of any tax imposed on ownership or its 
exercise-they cannot be dissociated from the persons from 
whose relationships they are derived. They are not in any 
sense fictions. They are indisputable realities. 
"The power to tax 'is an incident of sovereignty, and is 
co-extensive with that to which it is an incident. All subjects 
over which the sovereign power of a state extends, are objects 
of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, upon 
the soundest principles, exempt from taxation.' McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 429 [4 L.Ed. 579]. But 
this does not mean that the sovereign power of the state does 
not extend over intangibles of a domiciled resident because 
they have no physical location within its territory, or that its 
power to tax is lost because we may choose to say they are 
located elsewhere. A jurisdiction which dOes not depend on 
physical presence within the state is not lost by declaring 
that it is absent. From the beginning of our constitutional 
system control over the person at the place of his domicile 
and his duty there, common to all citizens, to contribute to 
the support of government have been deemed to afi'ord an 
adequate constitutional basis for imposing on him a tax on 
the use and enjoyment of rights in intangibles measured by 
their value. bntil this moment that jurisdiction has not been 
thought to depend on any factor other than the domicile of 
the owner within the taxing state, or to compel the attribution 
to intangibles of a physical presence within its territory, 88 
though they were chattels, in order to support the tax." 
(Ourry v. McOanless, 307 U.S. 357, 365-367 [59 S.Ot. 900, 
83 L.Ed. 1339, 123 A.L.R. 162]; Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 
383,386 [59 S.Ct. 913, 83 L.Ed. 1356].) 
It follows, therefore, that since California did have the 
power to tax the transfer of the appointed property by the 
donee and plainly provided for such a tax, and since its· 
jurisdiction to impose the tax did not depend upon "the: 
) 
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attribution to intangibles of a physical presence within its 
territory," the fact that the legal title to the intangibles was 
beld by nonresident trustees and the evidences of ownership 
of the securities subject to Charlotte Bowditch's power of 
appointment were physically located outside the state should 
not have deprived California of jurisdiction to tax their trans· 
fer. in the light of its decision in Ourry v. McOanless, the 
United States Supreme Court in Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 
U.S. 657, 662·663, 665 [62 S.Ct. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097, 141 A.L.R. 
948], overruled its earlier decision in the Wachovia Bank & 
Trust Co. case and held that the state's jurisdiction to tax 
the transfer of the appointed property was not lost because 
the "intangibles ... have no physical location within its 
territory," so long as t.he donee of the power was domiciled in 
the taxing state. The court beld that there was no question 
that the statute there under consideration, essentially identical 
with section 2(6) of the 1921 act, taxed the transfer as one 
from the donee of the power of appointment,- or that New 
York had the constitutional power to enact such a statute. 
(Ohanler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466, 477 [27 S.Ct. 550, 51 L.Ed. 
882].) Since the transfer by the donee of the power was the 
taxable event, the residence of the donor was immaterial. 
"The mere fact that the power was acquired as a donation 
from another is without significance." (315 U.S. at 663.) 
Since the jurisdiction to tax intangibles is not dependent on 
physical presence within the state (Ourry v. McOanless, 
supra), it was held that neither the residence of the trustees 
nor the location of the evidences of ownerlShip of the appo.inted 
intangibles affected the jurisdiction of the taxing state. (315 
U.S. at 664·665.) For thesE' reasons, the New York statute, 
admittedly valid as to property located within the state, was 
held valid as to resident donees irrespective of the "physical 
and constructive situs" of the property. With the decision 
of tbe United States Supreme Court in Graves v. Schmidlapp, 
the decision of this court in Estate of Bowditch that California 
did not have the constitutional power to tax the transfer 
therein has been as conclusively repudiated as the similar 
decision of the New York Court of Appeals (State Tax Oom. 
V. Schmidlapp, 286 N.Y. 596 [35 N.E.2d 937), which was 
·"We are here concernE'd with a tax on the transfer of property from 
a decedent who by virtue of her power of appointment is. by the express 
language of the statutE' [the same liS section 2(6)]. deemed the absolute 
owner of the property to which ber power of appointment relates." 
(E8tate of Bohnert, 244 Wis. 404, 409 [12 N.W.2d 684].) 
) 
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reversed in Graves v. Schmidlapp. The question therefore is 
not, as respondent asserts, whether Estate of Bowditch as a 
decision on statutory construction should be overruled, but 
whether Estate of Bowditch as a decision on California's con-
stitutional power to tax contrary to the latest decision of the 
United States Supreme Court must be overruled. As a deci-
sion predicated on the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution, Estate of Bowditch cannot survive Curry v. 
McCanless and Graves v. Schmidlapp. 
Respondent, however, contends that "even if Estate of 
Bowditch has been overruled by a 1942 decision [Graves v. 
8chmidlapp] as to any constitutional question involved, the 
1935 act and the 1941 amendments were made in view of 
and adopted the rule of that case." It is her view that the 
reenactment of section 2(6) of the 1921 act after Estate of ' 
Bowditch without change therein was ,. obviously motivated 
by a desire to conform the statute to the Court's decision," 
for, had the Legislature disapproved the decision therein, it 
would have expressly repudiated it. It is in effect contended 
that the perpetuation of an erroneous interpretation of the 
United States Constitution may be achieved by legislative 
failure to defy the decisions of this court and of the Supreme 
Court of the United States announcing that interpretation. 
Section 2 (6) of the 1921 act insofar as it governs the present 
case was not amended in 1935; it was incorporated into the 
1935 act just as it read at the time the Bowditch case was de-
cided. The shifting of the tax from the exercise of the power 
by the donee to the creation of the power by the donor was 
expressly made applicable only to powers created by donors 
dying after June 25, 1935, the effective date of the amendment; 
as to powers I created by donors dying before that date but 
exercised thereafter, the exercise of the power remained "a 
transfer taxable under the provisions of this act, in the same 
manner as though the property to which such appointment 
relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power." The 
express language of the statute negatives any inference that 
the Legislature repealed the provision taxing the transfer by 
the exercise of the power because of the construction and appli-
cation it was given by Estate of Bowditch. How, in the face 
of the fact that the Legislature incorporated the earlier statute 
verbatim into the 1935 act, can it be said that it repealed the 
provision' The Legislature could not more clearly demon-
strate an intention to stand by the method of taxing such 
transfers so far as it constitutionally could do so. That in-
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tention is also demonstrated by the 1923 amendment of section 
2 (1) of the 1921 act (Stats. 1923, ch. 337, p. 694), providing 
for the taxation of all transfers at death of intangible personal 
property of resident decedent!> "within or without the State 
or subject to the jurisdiction thereof. " (Italicized words 
added by the 1923 amendment.) By that amendment the 
Legislature clearly expressed an intention to tax all transfers 
at death to the full extent of California's jurisdiction to tax. 
No other construction of legislative intention can be main-
tained consistently with this amendment. 
Whatever merit there may be in the theory that the re-
enactment of a statute without change adopts the judicial 
construction thereof (cf. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 
61, 69 [66 8. Ct. 826, 90 L.Ed. 1084]; Cleveland v. United 
States, 329 U.S. 14, 22-23 [67 8. Ct. 13, 91 L.Ed. 12] ; Helver-
ing v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 [60 8.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 
125 A.L.R. 1368] ), it is limited to cases in which the preceding 
decision has purported to interpret the statute. It has no 
application when the decision was that enforcement of the 
statute was beyond the state's constitutional power. Estate of 
Bowditch did not interpret section 2 (6) of the 1921 act; it 
decided that, as properly interpreted, the statute prescribed 
a tax that was beyond California's jurisdiction to impose. The 
decision therein was so interpreted by a later decision of this 
court (Estate of Dillingham, 196 Cal. 525, 534 [238 P. 367]), 
and was cited by the United States Supreme Court as authority 
for its decision that a similar application of an identical statute 
by North Carolina was beyond its constitutional power. (Wa-
choviaBank & Trust1 00. v.Doughton, 272 U.S. 567, 575 [47 
S.Ct. 202, 71 L.Ed. 413] ; see also, Wachovia Bank & Prust 
Co.v. Doughton, 189 N.C. 50, 55 [126 S.E. 176] ; Trowbridge, 
Recent Inheritance Tax and Estate Tax Decisions, 14 Cal.L. 
Rev. 1, 8; Nossaman, State Taxation of Intangibles, 18 Cal. 
L.Rev. 345, 369.) It would be an anomalous doctrine that 
legislative reenactment of a statute held partially unconstitu-
tional adopts the decision on the issue of constitutionalIty as 
part of the statute. This court is not estopped to correct its 
own error merely because the Legislature has not chosen to 
defy the court's interpretation of the United States Con-
stitution. 
For the same reasons, it cannot be inferred from the Con-
troller's failure to reassert the provisions of section 2 (6) in 
cases such as Estate of B01l'd1'tch that his inaction constitutes 
an administrative interpretation of the statute the same u that 
I 
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now urged by respondent. The Controller's failure after 
Estate of Bowditch to attempt to tax such transfers did not 
demonstrate an interpretation of the statute, but only the 
recognition that under Bowditch and Wachovia the applica-
tion of the statute according to the plain meaning of its pro-
visions would be unconstitutional. The Controller can no 
more be required to defy the decisions of this court and the 
United States Supreme Court on the constitutionality of a 
statute than can the state Legislature. The Controller did 
not unduly delay in asserting the jurisdiction that the United 
States Supreme Court in 1942 asserted that he has; this pro-
ceeding was begun in 1943. It cannot reasonably be said that 
this is a case in which administrative or legislative inaction 
demonstrates an intention to accept an interpretation of the 
statute at variance with its plain meaning and the interpreta-
tion given identical statutes by the United States Supreme 
Court and the courts of other states. {Graves v. Schmidlapp, 
315 U.S. 657,662-663 [62 S.Ot. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097, 141 A.L.R. 
948] ; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 189 N.C. 50, 
53 [126 S.E. 176) ; Pitman v. Pitman, 314 Mass. 465, 469 [50 
N.E.2d 69) ; National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 815 Mass. 457, 
472 [53 N.E.2d 113] ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Kelly, 134 N.J.Eq. 
120,133 [34 A.2d 538] ; Estate of Rohnert, 244 Wis. 404, 409 
[12 N.W.2d 684].) 
Amici curiae on behalf of respondent contend that if section 
2 (6) of the 1935 act is construed to apply to the transfer in 
the present case, the statute violates the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it arbitrarily 
discriminates between resident donees exercising powers of 
appointment created by donors dying before June 25,-1935, 
and resident donees exercising powers created by donors dyinR 
after that date. It is contended that, since the taxability of 
the exercise of the power by the donee depends upon the date 
of death of the donor, the statute is invalid for the reasons 
stated in Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 [57 8. Ct. 206, 81 
L.Ed.239]. 
Binney v. Long involved a 1909 Massachusetts statute under 
which the transfer of property by the exercise or non-exercise 
of a power of appointment created by a donor dying before 
1907 was taxed, but no tax was imposed if the power was 
created after 1907. A divided court, Justices Cardozo and 
Brandeis dissenting, held that the statute was invalid in that it 
arbitrarily selected a past date and discriminated between 
powera of appointment created before that date and tho8e 
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ereated thereafter. It is clear that the invalidity of the statute 
was not predicated upon the selection of a date upon which the 
taxability or nontaxability of the transfer depended, but upon 
the fact that the selection of the date bore no reasonable rela-
tion to any legitimate legislative purpose. "Upon its face the 
atatute arbitrarily selects a past date, taxing the beneficiaries 
of an act if done prior to, and leaving untaxed beneficiaries of 
a precisely similar act if done subsequent to that date;" 
(Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280, 289 [57 S.Ot. 206, 81 
L.Ed. 239].) 
Binney v. Long has since been limited to the particular 
situation with which it was concerned and held not to apply 
to a statute in which the date upon which taxability· is made 
to depend is not arbitrarily selected but is designed to e1fec-
tuate a legitimate legislative purpose. (Whitney v. State Taz 
Comm., 309 U.S. 530, 541 [60 s.Ct. 635,84 L.Ed. 909].) In 
the Whitney case the court held constitutional a New York 
statute similar to that in the present case in which the taxation 
of transfers of property subject to a power of appointment w~ 
shifted from the exercise of the power to the gift thereof, and 
in which an unintended tax immunity was averted by the pro-
vision that powers created before the effective date of the 
change but exercised thereafter would be taxed under the 
statute in effect at the time of their creation. In 1930 the New 
York Legislature shifted the tax on transfers of property sub-
ject to a power of appointment from the exercise by the donee 
to the creation by the donor. Powers created before 1930 but 
exercised after that date were immune from taxation, since 
they were created at the time the tax was imposed upon their 
exercise and they were exercised at the time the tax was im-
posed on their creation. By amendment to the inheritance tax 
act in 1932, New York .pecifically provided that as to such 
powers the method of taxation prevailing before 1930 should 
govern, just as the California Legislature has done in the 
1935 and 1941 amendments of section 2 (6). The court upheld 
the statute against the contention that it was invalid under 
the doctrine of Binney v. Long, supra, in that it discriminated 
between donees whose powers were created before 1930 and 
who were taxed on the exercise thereof, i.nd those whose 
powers were created after 1930 and were exempt from taxa-
tion on their exercise. The Binney case was distinguished on 
the ground that the date upon which taxation depended was 
arbitrarily selected whereas in the Whitney case it was the 
date upon which the change in method of tuatioD became 
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effective, and the classification of powers into those created be-
fore 1930 and those created thereafter was reasonably related 
to the legislative purpose of preventing an unintended tax 
immunity. It was this statute. that, as applied to resident 
donees of powers created by nonresident donors, was upheld 
by the United States Supreme Court in Graves v. Schmidlapp, 
315 U.S. 657 [62 S.Ot. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097, 141 A.L.R. 948]. 
The Whitney ease cannot be distinguished on the ground 
that the power there considered was created by a resident 
donor. There, as in the present case, the statute unequivocally 
imposed the tax on the exercise of the power by the resident 
donee whether the donor was a resident of the state or not. 
The statute was upheld on the ground that it was merely a 
continuation of the method of taxation in force at the time 
of their creation for powers created before 1930 but exercised 
thereafter. Such a tax may be properly imposed even though 
the donor of the power was a nonresident and the transfer 
would not have been taxable had the power been created after 
1930. (Graves v. Schmidlap, supra, 315 U.S. 657.) Since 
the residence of the donor does not control the imposition of 
a tax upon the transfer by the donee, it cannot be material 
to a claim that equal protection of the laws has been denied. 
This appeal is therefore governed by Whitney v. State Tax 
Oommission and not by Binney v. Long. Before June 25, 
1935, the exercise of the power of appointment was made the 
taxable event; after that date, the tax is imposed npon the 
creation of the power. In cases such as the present, however, 
where the donor died before the effective date of the change and 
the donee exercised the power after that date, neither tax would 
apply and the same unintended tax immunity would be 
created as in the New York statute before its amendment. The 
California Legislature took the same course as the New York 
Legislature and provided that as to such powers the t.ax 
would be imposed under the statute previously in effect. 
(Section 2 (6) of the 1921 act, as amended in 1929.) In this 
manner, the Legislature created the same two classes of resi-
dent donees as those approved in the Whitney case. Given 
the legislative purpose to be achieved by the classification, 
the equal protection clause only requires that the classifica-
tion be reasonably related to the achievement of that purpose 
and that all persons within each class be treated alike. (Estate 
of Elston, 32 Oal.App.2d 652, 658-659 [90 P.2d 608].) 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied October 
I,l95O. 
